As the world ponders Iran's expanding nuclear prowess – and wonders whether an atomic bomb might result – there has been a tendency to overlook an important fact: Iran has also been building a fleet of long-range missiles ideally suited to carrying nuclear warheads. With the help of North Korea, Russia and China, Iran has been able to field short and medium range missiles, including one that could deliver a nuclear-sized payload to Israel and Saudi Arabia.
This brief essay traces the history of Iran's missile effort and explains where Iran managed to find foreign help.
EARLY MISSILE AMBITIONS
Iran's determination to acquire and produce ballistic missiles grew out of its war with Iraq in the 1980s. Tehran found itself ill-prepared to retaliate against Iraq's missile attacks on Iranian cities. Tehran decided that for its own protection, it had to achieve self-reliance in missile production.
Scud B and Scud C
Iran's first efforts to achieve this aim focused on the import and production of short-range Scud-type missiles. In 1985, the then-head of Iran's Parliament, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, led a high-level delegation to Libya, Syria, North Korea and China. As a result of the trip, Iran obtained Scud missiles from Libya and North Korea, and later acquired rocket components and know-how from both North Korea and China.
Iran's first batch of Scuds (known as Scud Bs) arrived from Libya in 1985. These single-stage, nuclear capable, Soviet-origin missiles use liquid fuel and can fly about 280-300 kilometers when carrying a 770-1,000 kilogram warhead. Before long, Iran had depleted its small supply. It then turned to North Korea in hope of finding a new supplier. Tehran offered to help finance Pyongyang's missile program in exchange for technology transfer and an option to buy North Korean missiles as soon as they came off the production line.
The first batch of North Korean Scud Bs was delivered in July 1987, and it was reported that the delivery took place even before the missiles were available to North Korea's own army. Over the next seven months, Iran imported 90-100 missiles, most of which were promptly used in combat. According to the U.S. Defense Department, Iran fired nearly 100 Scuds at Iraq between 1985 and 1988.
After the war ended, Tehran continued its missile efforts. By late 1990, Tehran had negotiated to buy North Korea's newest missile offering, the Scud C. U.S. intelligence began to detect shipments of North Korean Scud C missiles moving to Iran in 1991. The liquid-fuel Scud C is longer and wider than the Scud B, which suggests that the fuel tanks have been expanded to hold more propellant. It has an estimated range of more than 500 kilometers when carrying a 700 kilogram warhead. According to press reports, Iran ordered some 200 Scud Bs and Scud Cs from North Korea in 1991. Iran also succeeded in test-firing what U.S. intelligence identified as a Scud C in 1991.
In 1992, the U.S. State Department imposed trade sanctions against the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics for engaging in "missile technology proliferation activities" with North Korea. Under U.S. law, Washington can penalize a foreign company or person who engages in the transfer of Scud-size missiles or of equipment or technology that "contributes to the design, development or production of missiles" to a country such as Iran.
In early 1993, an additional North Korean shipment of Scud Cs, along with several launching pads, was reported by the Israeli media. According to U.S. intelligence, Pyongyang also supplied Scud production technology. "Iran's relationship with North Korea follows the usual pattern," said a U.S. State Department official at the time, "you first buy entire missiles and the kits to assemble missiles, and then you learn to make them on your own – designs and blueprints come with the package." According to the official, North Korean specialists worked on the ground in Iran to help Iranian scientists master the basic steps of Scud production. In 1993, Iranian Minister of Defense Akbar Torkan announced that "our technological capability is such that if we require similar missiles [to the Scud-B] then we can manufacture them ourselves."
According to The Middle East Military Balance, an annual survey of military might published by Israel's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, Iran was already thought to have acquired or built some 300 Scud B missiles and 100 Scud Cs by 1994. The CIA, in a report on missile proliferation in 2003, estimated that Iran possessed "a few hundred" short-range ballistic missiles at that time.
INCREASING THE RANGE
Shahab 3
In July 1998, Iran took a giant step forward by flight-testing a version of North Korea's medium-range NoDong missile, components of which Iran had imported. This liquid-fueled, road mobile, nuclear capable ballistic missile became known as the Shahab 3 in Iran. According to Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahab 3 is designed to carry a 1,200 kg payload 1,300 km; however, another report estimates the missile's payload at around 750 kg. Prototypes of the missile have been on public display.
Iran has subjected the missile to at least six test flights. During the first test in July 1998, the missile exploded in mid-air during the latter portion of its flight, leading U.S. officials to question whether the test was a failure or the explosion was intentional. A second test took place in July 2000, which Iran's state media called a success. In September 2000, Iran conducted a third test of the Shahab 3, but the missile reportedly exploded shortly after launch. In May 2002, Iran conducted another test, which it claimed was successful and which Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) also called successful. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said that the test enhanced the Shahab 3's "power and accuracy." Another test reportedly occurred only two months later, in July 2002, and was unsuccessful. Despite the mixed results of these test flights, Iran's foreign ministry claimed on July 7, 2003 that Iran had completed a "final test" of the Shahab 3 "a few weeks ago." According to the New York Times, the ministry described the test flight as "the final test before delivering the missile to the armed forces."
The Shahab 3, like the North Korean NoDong missile from which it is derived, is a scaled-up version of the Scud B and Scud C missiles, and shares the Scud's weaknesses. The Scud B is only accurate to within about a kilometer of its target at a range of 300 km. Because accuracy diminishes with range for a given guidance system, the accuracy of the Shahab 3 at its range of 1,300 km has been estimated at no better than three kilometers of its target, making it of little use as a battlefield weapon. With such low accuracy, it could not be co
unted on to hit troops or even an airfield. Instead, it seems intended for use against cities. The CIA estimates that Iran "probably has a small number of Shahab 3's available for use," although questions remain about their performance.
Shahab 4
In 1999, Iran's defense minister announced that Iran would develop a more powerful successor to the Shahab 3, called the Shahab 4. This missile appears to be based on Russia's obsolete SS 4 "Sandal" missile. The SS 4 is a large, single-stage, nuclear-capable weapon with a range of approximately 1,800-2,000 km. However, Iran later characterized the Shahab 4 as a space launch vehicle. In November 2003, Iran's defense ministry was quoted as saying that Iran did not have any program "to build a Shahab 4 missile." Despite this announcement, the United States remains skeptical of Iran's assertion that the Shahab 4 has no military application. According to a 2001 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, Iran could choose to develop space launch vehicles as a technical base for intermediate and intercontinental-range missiles.
SOLID FUEL TECHNOLOGY
In addition to its Scud and Shahab missiles, which rely on liquid fuel technology dating from World War II, Iran has been developing solid fuel technology, which is more advanced.
One of Iran's earliest steps in this direction was to produce the "Mushak" short-range surface-to-surface missile. A U.S. official compared this primitive solid fuel missile to the unguided Soviet Frog missile and to the Pakistani Hatf 1 missile, which flies about 80 kilometers. The first Mushak, also known as the Iran-130, was test-fired in early 1988, and was designed to fly to a maximum range of 130 kilometers. By March 1988, five Mushak missiles had been fired at Iraq during the War of the Cities. And by August 1988, Tehran had test-fired a 160-kilometer-range Mushak and announced that mass production would soon follow. Iran claimed that the Mushak was designed and produced without foreign help, but Chinese assistance was suspected.
Iran also possesses the solid-fueled, Chinese-made, 150 kilometer range CSS 8 (also called the Tondar 69) and a second solid fuel missile called the Fateh 110. Both are short-range, tactical missiles. Iran claims to have successfully flight tested the Fateh 110 in September 2002. It is reportedly a single-stage missile with at least a 200 km range. Mr. Rafsanjani, who has served as head of Iran's Parliament and as President of Iran, has asserted that Iran produced the solid fuel propellant for the missile. In addition, Defense Minister Shamkhani announced in January 2000 that Iran had commissioned projects to produce the solid fuel ingredients HTPB resin, aluminum powder and potassium chlorite at the Ministry of Defense's Education and Research Institute. The Aerospace Industries Organization, which reportedly manages a number of missile plants, claims to be capable of producing "many types of liquid and solid propellant." According to an Iranian media report, the Aerospace Industries Organization opened a plant to mass produce the Fateh 110 in mid-September 2002, after completing a successful test flight.
CLAIMS BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN
The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an exiled Iranian opposition group that is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, has made a number of claims about Iran's missile program. Its claims should be viewed with caution. Nevertheless, its information has sometimes proved reliable. In the summer of 2002, the NCRI disclosed information about a number of Iranian nuclear sites that were either unknown or poorly understood at the time. The information proved accurate and triggered a strong international reaction.
The NCRI claims that Iran has already successfully tested the Shahab 4 at a missile firing range south of Semnan, in May and August 2002. According to the NCRI, Iran assembles the missile at the Hemat Industrial complex, a plant that belongs to the Revolutionary Guard Corps and that is located on the Damavand Tehran Highway. The NCRI asserts that the missile has a range of up to 2,000 km and can carry a 1,500 kg warhead. The U.S. government has not confirmed any of these claims.
The NCRI has also named a number of plants that it says are producing missiles, and that are run by two organizations with strong ties to the Iranian government. The first is the Aerospace Industries Organization; the second is the Mechanical Industries Complex, which is related to the Defense Ministry's Defense Industries Organization. Germany has designated both organizations as suspect entities and has included them on its Early Warning List to German exporting companies. The NCRI claims that the Aerospace Industries Organization manages a number of missile-related factories and research centers, including the Missile Center of Saltanat-Abad, the Vanak Missile Center, the Parchin Missile Industries factories, the Baqeri base factories Numbers 1-3, the Tabriz Bakeri base factory, the Bakeri Missile Industries factory, the Hemmat Missile Industries factory, the Bagh Shian (Almehdi) Missile Industries, the Shah-Abadi Industrial Complex, the Khajir Complex, the Baqerololum Missile Research Center, the Mostafa Khomeini base factory, and the Quadiri Base factory.
FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
The Iranian missile program and the speed of its development would not have been possible without extensive assistance from abroad, notably from North Korea, Russia and China. While North Korea furnished the basic hardware for liquid-fueled rocket propulsion, Russia supplied materials, equipment and training. China supplied help with guidance and solid-fueled rocket propulsion. According to the CIA, all three countries were still helping in 2003. During the first half of 2003, the CIA reported, these countries continued to provide "equipment, technology, and expertise."
North Korea
As noted above, North Korea has furnished the basic building blocks for Iran's liquid fuel, Scud-type missile effort. Iran has received both complete missiles and the plants to build them. In effect, North Korea has served as Iran's off-shore missile development site. Iran's most powerful missiles, the Shahab 3 and the Scud B and C, have come directly from North Korean factories, either in the form of components or finished missiles.
The State Department has repeatedly sanctioned the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, North Korea's main missile exporter. In May 1996, it levied sanctions against Changgwang Sinyong and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Since 2000, Changgwang has been sanctioned repeatedly for proliferation activities with Iran. Changgwang was also reportedly the source of 12 NoDong missile engines that arrived in Iran from North Korea on November 21, 1999. The engines were most likely intended for use in the Shahab 3.
China
For years, Beijing has been a major supplier of battlefield and cruise missiles to Iran. In 1987, Iran purchased the Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missile and then acquired the more capable C-802, a Chinese anti-ship missile that Iran reportedly test-fired in 1996 from one of its ten Chinese-built "Houdong" patrol boats. Iran has also acquired at least 20 Chinese CSS 8 surface-to-surface missiles, which can carry a 190 kilogram warhead up to 150 kilometers.
China has also outfitted Iran with solid fuel missile technology. Beijing's help appears to have started in the 1980s, during Iran's work on the Mushak missile, described above. In 1998, The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known as the Rumsfeld Commission after its chair, the Hon. Donald Rumsfeld) reported that China had already "carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program."
In addition, Iran has received missile testing and guidance assistance from China. In June 1996, the chairman of a Congressional hearing cited U.S. intelligence findings that China had already "delivered dozens, perhaps hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized tools to Iran." One press report has linked China Great Wall Industry to the supply of missile testing technology, and another has linked China Great Wall to an agreement to supply Iran telemetry equipment. The press has also reported an agreement by China Precision Engineering Institute to supply gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment to Iran.
In response to such sales, the U.S. State Department has sanctioned a number of Chinese firms for engaging in proliferation activities with Iran. In June 2003, the State Department sanctioned the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) along with four other Chinese companies. NORINCO was previously sanctioned by the State Department in May 2003 for missile proliferation activities, reportedly with Iran. According to a media report, NORINCO had sold missile technology sometime in 2002 to Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, an agency charged with developing and producing many of Iran's missiles.
A number of other Chinese firms engaged in missile-related work have also been punished by the United States for proliferation activities with Iran, including the Taian Foreign Trade General Corporation; the China Shipbuilding Trading Company; and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC). CPMIEC markets the "M-family" missile, liquid and solid rocket motors, precision machinery, and a variety of tactical missiles. It, like a number of other Chinese firms, is a repeat offender.
In recent years, the Chinese government has pledged to improve its proliferation posture, notably by committing not to assist any country in the development of a ballistic missile capable of delivery a nuclear weapon and by adopting a set of export control laws. In 2004, China also began talks with officials from the Missile Technology Control Regime on Beijing's national export control system and China's possible membership in the regime. Despite these efforts, a number of Chinese firms should be expected to continue proliferating missile technology to Iran in the future.
Russia
Despite Russia's adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime since 1995, Russian entities have continued to help Iran develop missiles. In October 2000, the CIA reported to Congress that Russian assistance had "helped Iran save years in its development of the Shahab 3." And in its report covering missile proliferation during the first half of 2003, the CIA observed that Russian assistance was also supporting "Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production."
In July 1998, the State Department imposed sanctions on seven Russian entities for "proliferation activities related to Iran's missile programs." They were the INOR Scientific Center, Grafit Research Insititute, Polyus Scientific Production Association, Glavkosmos, MOSO Company, Baltic State Technical University, and Europalace 2000.
Reportedly, INOR contracted in September 1997 to supply special alloys for long-range missiles, including steel for missile casings and foil to shield missile guidance components. In addition, Russia's arms exporting agency, Rosvoorouzhenie, and Russia's space agency head, Yuri Koptev, were allegedly involved in Iran's Shahab program. Rosvoorouzhenie was also reportedly helping to construct a wind tunnel, which can be used to design and test missile components. Russian assistance to Iran's Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) was thought to include solid rocket fuel technology and the design of guidance and propulsion systems. Europalas 2000 reportedly was caught shipping Iran 22 tons of stainless steel that could have been used to make fuel tanks for Scuds, while Polyus was suspected of supplying navigation and guidance technology. Grafit was said to make material used to coat missile warheads, and U.S. officials reportedly suspected that Iranians were being trained in missile guidance and propulsion at Baltic State Technical University and through a joint missile education center called Persepolis. These suspicions culminated in the Russian investigations and the U.S. sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. government believes that Iran is dedicated to developing an indigenous long range ballistic missile capability. However, estimates of how quickly Iran is likely to move beyond its medium range Shahab 3 missile vary. According to a 2001 National Intelligence Estimate on ballistic missile development, most U.S. intelligence agencies predict that the United States will "most likely" face an intercontinental ballistic missile threat from Iran by 2015. However, one agency assesses that Iran will not pose such a threat until after 2015. As in Iran's past missile efforts, Iran's success in developing more advanced missiles will depend on its ability to rely on foreign help
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